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Abstract.
Much contemporary research on personality synthesis in compu-
tational models and robots is superficial, in the sense that it involves
simulating the surface appearance of personality. A deeper concep-
tion of personality is that it is a long-term affective control state
within a complex control system that is relatively hard to change,
slow to learning, and whose causes and effects are more diffuse and
indirect than short-term control states like episodes of anger, fear,
happiness or relief. This paper will extend this control state con-
ception of personality by broadening it to consider personality as
a holistic and multi-level construct. McAdams and Pals’ five prin-
ciples for personality are proposed as an integrating framework for
computational modelling of personality as a control state. The pa-
per then argues that extended verbal discourse is a promising mod-
elling scenario to drive the design of integrated multi-level models
because it involves multi-level cognitive control and is very demand-
ing in terms of self-reflective meta-cognitive governance. Narrative
transcripts from the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) are then pre-
sented as a valuable source of detailed empirical data to be used in
creating modelling scenarios across lifespan development. Lastly, the
paper presents some initial mini-scenario elements and a sketch of an
architecture to be developed to simulate these mini-scenarios.
1 PERSONALITY, ATTACHMENT AND
CONTROL SYSTEMS
In 1995, in the paper “What sort of control system is able to have
a personality”, [24], Sloman suggested that personality should be
viewed as a long-term intelligent control state. In this control systems
view, high-level and long-term personality states are comprised of a
collection of component lower level and shorter term sub-states that
act together in a coherent manner. They act as control states by initi-
ating, maintaining, modifying and terminating information processes
related to desires, beliefs, deliberations about the consequences of
actions, intentions, plans and other substates in mind-like control
systems ([23], p. 10). Shorter-term affective control states such as
anger have functions such as communication and action readiness.
For example, if an organism perceives a threat, a global alarm may
be triggered that momentarily ‘hijacks’ the entire architecture before
returning to the initial state. Behaviour characteristic of a particular
personality is produced in hierarchical control systems because the
system’s high level control states are causal control states. Higher-
level control states manage lower control states, including emotional
states, and through these manage the system’s interaction with the
world. High level causal states can be functional in the sense of being
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adaptive, effectively managing overall behaviour in a coherent man-
ner. Alternatively, some high-level personality control states may be
dysfunctional or even pathological in terms of how effectively they
direct behaviour.
The issue of how to model personality control states is relevant to
attachment modelling because both personality and attachment states
can both be viewed as long-term control states composed of shorter
term control states. Figure 1 presents both personality types and at-
tachment states as long-term control states which are related to other
types of semantic control state. However, the fact that both person-
ality and attachment are long-term control states does not mean that
personality and attachment states are similar in all respects. Impor-
tantly, personality is highly inheritable [7]. In contrast, in attachment
research, inherited temperamental traits have been found to be or-
thogonal to attachment classifications. For example, attachment state
is relationship specific - individuals may have different attachment
classification with different caregivers [26]. So to summarise the
comparison of attachment status with personality - whilst attachment
status is learnt, it still comprises a long-term control state within a
complex control system.
LONGER TERM INTERMEDIATE SHORTER TERM
Personality, Moods, neural and
Temperament, Beliefs, physical events,
Attitudes, Preferences,
Skills, Emotions such
Emotions such as joy, fear,
as love, grief, Intentions,
Attachment Plans,
states Desires
Figure 1. Classes of semantic control state, which are compared with
respect to the approximate duration that each class of control state may exist
as a disposition within an architecture (adapted from [24] and [18]).
1.1 Computational models of Personality
Research papers based on viewing personality as a long-term con-
trol state are not readily evident in the contemporary literature on
computational modelling of personality. In their 2014 survey of this
field, Vinciarelli and Mohammadi organise the review of personality
computing research in three categories:
• Automatic Personality Recognition, which involves making infer-
ences of the true personality of an individual from automatically
processed behavioural evidence. The evidence can include distal
cues such as written texts and logged information from electronic
devices;
• Automatic Personality Perception, which involves making in-
ferences of personality based on automatically observable be-
haviours, such as speech, other aspects of paralanguage, non-
verbal behaviour, and communication from social media;
• Automatic Personality Synthesis, which involves generation of
artificial personalities through software and embodied agents in-
cluding robots
Whereas automatic personality recognition and perception are di-
rected towards creating systems for classifying human personality,
automatic personality synthesis involves creating artificial systems
like software agents or robots whose behaviour can itself be recog-
nised and perceived as having personality. However, of the nine-
teen papers which Vinciarelli and Mohammadi cite as examples of
automatic personality synthesis, none involve simulating personal-
ity as a long-term control state in the manner described by Sloman
[24]. There are some examples of less superficial implementations.
Surendran and Long do provide an example implementation of a sys-
tem from which temperament-like states emerge [25]. However, this
highly abstract simulation is not intended to closely match human
temperament. So overall, what contemporary work in this field fails
to provide is richer theories and models which explain the causal and
functional interactions between a variety of long-term and shorter
term motives, and related control states.
2 PERSONALITY AND PERSONAL
NARRATIVE
McAdams and Pals [14] put forward a comprehensive personality
psychology framework for understanding the whole person as an in-
dividual. To do this they draw together five principles. for an inte-
grative conception of an individual. We will review these five dimen-
sions from the perspective of the design based approach [27]. That
is, considering how the five principles might be simulated together in
integrated systems. In McAdams and Pals’ view a holistic approach
includes:
• considering human behaviour as more or less constrained by
evolutionary design. Much of the nature humans possess in com-
mon in personality terms results from our shared possession of
species specific designs adapted to a cognitive niche [22]. Human
needs from nutrition and sleep to attachment, autonomy, compe-
tence, relatedeness should all be explained, at least in part, by this
approach. For the computational modeller, this approach requires
architectural designs to be based on some fixed core architecture
which is provided by evolution as a starting point for lifespan
adaptation and customisation to the environment an individual ex-
periences.
• the five-factor psychometric model of personality. This or-
ganises personality traits into categories labelled: extraver-
sion/introversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, agreeableness,
and openness [8]. The approach of McAdams and Pals described
here subsumes this five factor psychometric model as just one
principle of a broader view of personality. Traits are reasonably
good predictors for life outcomes like work and relationship suc-
cess [2]. Researchers have speculated that the kinds of questions
that would be expected to arise in social groups in the environ-
ment of evolutionary adaptedness are addressed in a particularly
apt manner by the five-factor traits [7]. For example, extrover-
sion/introversion can be associated with social dominance; neu-
roticism with stability; agreeableness and conscientiousness with
different aspects of potential for cooperation; and openness with
capacity for change and learning ( [14], p. 208). However, disposi-
tional trait dimensions are decontextualised and general - speaking
to an overall style of engagement with life. We can see from Vin-
ciarelli and Mohammadi’s recent survey that this principle forms
the framework for most personality computing. A design based
approach would simulate the emergence of these behaviour pat-
terns by complex internal functional processes.
• characteristic adaptations which are more contextualised than
traits. McAdams and Pals suggest that this level of description for
personality is of interest to psychotherapists, counsellors, men-
tors, life-coaches and parents because it focuses on questions
like: “What do people want? What do they value? How do peo-
ple seek out what they want and avoid what they fear? How do
people develop plans, goals, and programs for their lives? How
do people think about and cope with the challenges they face?
What psychological and social tasks await people at particular
stages or times in their lives?” ([14], p. 208). The characteris-
tic adaptations which McAdams and Pals mention as underly-
ing behaviour related to these kinds of questions is similar to
the kinds of intermediate-term control states that Sloman and co-
workers [24, 27, 18] present. A combined list from these sources
includes: motives, goals, plans, strivings, strategies, standards,
values, virtues, attachments, preferences, attitudes, moods, ambi-
tions, obsessions, grief, desires, intentions, schemas, self-images,
emotions like fear, anger, happiness and relief, and mental repre-
sentations of significant others.
• life narratives that are the integrative life stories that are con-
structed by individuals in a process of meaning making and
personal and social identity formation. Life narratives can in-
corporate the reconstructed past, imagined future and allow an in-
dividual to “keep going”( [14], p. 209) through biasing the percep-
tion of events so that they become assimilated into a “more or less
coherent whole”( [14], p. 209). Self narrative can augment the pre-
dictive power of personality measures beyond those of parametric
trait measures. For example, hopeful endings in self-narrative pre-
dict future well-being. Whilst each life story is unique, emotional
tones in narratives cluster in life narrative themes. For example, a
life narrative labelled ‘the redemptive self’ is a kind of life story
about being delivered from suffering which is linked to individu-
als who become productive, caring and prosocial ( [14], p. 210).
Narrative interpretation of experiences can prime future growth.
Positive examples include: “I found out how to make our relation-
ship better” and “I hope that never happens again” ( [14], p. 210).
Narrative accounts that include exploration and accommodation
moderate the dispositional traits of openness. Computational mod-
elling of life-narratives is clearly a major challenge. However, an
important contribution of this paper is to argue that behavioural
scenarios can facilitate modelling this sort of phenomena when
they include particularly rich behaviour patterns that arise in sys-
tematically structured contexts (see section 2.2).
• considering how culture affects different levels of personality
in different ways. It can do this by providing a palette of scripts,
plots, role-models, warnings, tokens, and images for an individual
when they are constructing their narrative. As with life-narratives,
modelling an individual’s embedding in a culture is a major chal-
lenge. However, the benefit of attempting this sort of modelling
would be the ability to computationally model phenomena like so-
cial marginalisation and radicalisation as deep internal processes
with latent variables rather than through statistical analysis solely
focused on externally observable behavioural variables.
2.1 PERSONALITY AND CONVERSATION
If computational modellers accept the grand challenge of creating
simulations which integrate across McAdams and Pals’ five prin-
ciples they need a source of rich and detailed scenarios to drive
model design and allow model evaluation. Donald illustrates the re-
quirements for multi-level cognitive control using the example of a
group of people deeply involved in a lengthy conversation [9]. The
challenges of ‘keeping up one’s end of conversation’ illustrates the
demands of processing the interchange of ideas and opinions and
making appropriate contributions in an ongoing conversation. Social
events can be demanding to ‘hold in mind’ as they can take time
to unfold. People in conversation generate novel, rich, and mean-
ingful material, highly changeable as the conversation shifts - and
this ability to respond appropriately to novel material, and produce
novel but relevant material in return, can extend over an extended
period of time. Donald argues that this requires continuous self- and
other-monitoring over multiple time scales which is very demanding
in terms of self-reflective metacognitive governance and the require-
ment to store large amounts of knowledge [9].
Conversations can extend from minutes to hours. During these
episodes what is said and thought is converted to long-term memo-
ries, which continue to causally influence ongoing interaction. What
is said or thought at one moment in time can gain momentum and
change the overall direction of conversation. Any conversational
episode has a broader physical and social context into which it is
situated and bracketed. When participants stop taking this into ac-
count they are in a sense, removing themselves from the reality of the
situation. In this view, effective meta-cognitive processes keep par-
ticipants tied to reality, and lapses in these processes can leave partic-
ipants ‘in a world of their own’ ([9], p. 50). To keep up, each person
involved must track what is said and self-monitor thought nearly con-
tinuously. Many of the behaviours that enable participants to behave
in line with the context will be directed by unconscious scripts or
schema. This all means that conversation requires prodigious skills
in dynamic memory organisation, in accessing memories appropri-
ately, and in storing new facts for subsequent use in that conversation
or later. In this view, personality states are partly constituted of biases
and predispositions in cognitive control [9].
To explain this feat of multi-level awareness and governance, Don-
ald proposes a tripartite model, with: (1) momentary binding; (2)
short-term control; and (3) intermediate and longer term mechanisms
of awareness and governance. Perceptual binding explains the raw
feeling awareness. Donald terms this level 1 awareness and gover-
nance. Short-term awareness is what is measured in laboratory ex-
periments in consciousness research in experiments that typically
only last a number of seconds. Donald terms this level 2 awareness
and governance. At this short-term level of awareness and gover-
nance, controlled processing arises from the operation of short-term
working memory which extends perception to capture simple events
which can possess multiple active foci3. Working memory affords
3 During these episodes what is said and thought is transferred into long-term
memories, which continue to casually influence ongoing interaction. Tra-
ditional models of memory propose working memory is simply a transient
mode through which the information was encoded into long-term memories
[3]. Ericsson and Kintsch [10] propose that in order to carry out skilled ac-
tivities an addition of a long-term working memory (LTWM) in modelling
the capacity to hold an image or memory in awareness and so can
allow responses to be delayed. Working memory in its simplest form
is a kind of storage that sustains a perceptual trace in the absence
of the stimulus that produced it. Attention acts as a ’gate-keeper’
to working memory, which is also involved in controlled process-
ing of evaluations, selection, problem solving and response choice
([9], p. 186). Donald’s level 3 intermediate and longer-term aware-
ness and governance is extended by the operation of working mem-
ory through ‘fast switching’ of information in processing buffers in
and out of long-term memory. Lewis and Vashishth’s [12] simulation
of sentence comprehension is an example of intermediate control as
parsing of garden path sentences is carried out with a small capacity
for working memory and mechanisms for ‘fast switching’ between
production buffers and declarative memory. Intermediate awareness
and governance extends further into minutes, hours and days through
deeper integration with long-term memory which includes the kinds
of characteristic adaptations listed in section 2. The kinds of ‘events’
in level 2 and level 3 governance can be distinguished not just tempo-
rally but also by the breadth of level 3 governance to include broader
social, cultural and self-concerns [9]. This means at the third level of
awareness and governance control states like goals and plans direct
ongoing behaviour, and these are influenced by other control states
like standards, values, and preferences.
The level 3 system includes voluntary movement and self-initiated
actions, as well as supervisory evaluative processes. Particularly hu-
man self consciousness emerges from level 3 governance. According
to Donald [9], level 3 awareness and governance supports complex
states of integration with the social and historical environment which
Donald terms ‘deep enculturation’:
“When broken down into their components, the skills we
acquire from deep enculturation can be reduced to chains of al-
gorithms that can control attention and emotional valences. At-
tention determines the sequential flow of memory fixations and
perceptual comparisons, and these determine the precise qual-
ity and sequencing of subjective experience, producing unique
juxtapositions in the mind’s eye and influencing what habits
we form and interpretations we place on events. The emotional
valences attached to various objects, events, and people are
an important part of the same process of conditioning the con-
scious mind. Such algorithms establish the continuity of experi-
ence. There is a coherence, an interconnnectedness, about con-
scious experiences that makes them very different from uncon-
scious ones, where ideas and images can coexist in a pell-mell
disorganised manner” ([9], pp. 212-213)
According to Donald, deep enculturation arises from humans de-
veloping from infancy submerged with symbolic cultures in a radi-
cally different process from any other species. Taken together, levels,
1, 2 and 3 afford episodic awareness of elaborate event representa-
tions. Each episode comprises multiply bound percepts which are
chunked into coherent representations. Deep enculturation refers to
processes beyond individual episodes to cite and fundamental struc-
turing of the mind. Humans acquire symbolic skills and concepts
supported through symbolic skills from the outside in [9]. Some of
the these concepts are standards and values which organise behaviour
in a general sense. From the perspective of modelling long-term con-
trol states like personality we can see it is perceptual, affective and
would explain the ability to leave a task and return to it without impaired
performance. This LTWM could explain the ability to have continued fluent
conversations with the ability to recall post event.
other processing biases that influence the ‘fast switching’ of informa-
tion into and out of working memory that is important. Different per-
sonalities will be constituted of different patterns of perceptual and
memory retrieval biases and action predispositions. Petters covers
similar ground when he discusses how control states ‘move’ around
an information processing architecture:
“there is constant relocating and transforming of motiva-
tors which is termed circulation. [...] useful control states be-
come more influential and ‘percolate’ up a hierarchy of dis-
positional control states. Ineffective motivators wither away in
influence. One important process is ‘diffusion’, in which the
impact of a major motivator leads it to become gradually dis-
tributed in myriad control states which can include new motive
generators, plans, preferences, predictive models, reflexes and
automatic responses [...] Meta-management attempts to influ-
ence these numerous processes but some are more controllable
than others.” ([15], p, 39)
To model personality-like states we need to implement processes
such as these. Information processes that bridge the moment to mo-
ment operation of working memory with much longer term reloca-
tion and transformation of longer term motivators are what lead to the
emergence of personality control states [4]. The next section presents
results from attachment research, a more helpfully circumscribed do-
main than personality. Whilst attachment phenomena range across
the lifespan they are focused on issues of responsiveness, sensitivity,
predictability and trust in close relationships.
2.2 USING VERBAL BEHAVIOUR TO
CLASSIFY ATTACHMENT STATUS
Whilst open ended unconstrained interviews or conversations may
tell us a lot of details about an individual, we cannot then readily
compare those details with other people in a systematic fashion. If
we look at individuals in different contexts, it is difficult to disen-
tangle the influences arising from within the person and the shaping
influences of the particular situation they are in. Whereas using stan-
dardised psychological procedures designed to assess an individual’s
state of mind allow easier and more meaningful comparison between
individuals.
The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) [11, 20] is not a kind of
free-wheeling conversation that might be taken in any direction what-
soever, such as the kind of conversation which Donald describes as a
challenge for multi-level awareness and governance (see section 2.1).
It is an interaction between an interviewer and interviewee which
has the objective of classifying an adult’s emotional and social at-
tachment status through interpretation of their verbal behaviour. The
AAI is designed to elucidate structural variations in how life his-
tory is presented that allow reliable inferences about the participant’s
internal state with regard to attachment [11]. The AAI possesses a
pre-specified interview format of 20 questions in a fixed order, but
with additional specific follow up probes to these main set questions.
The questioning and following arrangement must only highlight but
not alter the participant’s natural response tendencies. It opens with
a question asking for a general description of family relationships
in the speaker’s childhood. Further questions are asked about sep-
arations and experiences of rejection; and the effects of these ex-
periences on adult personality. A key section probes experiences of
bereavement. Experience of abuse is also asked about. The AAI ends
with the speaker being invited to express wishes for his or her real or
imagined child in the future [11]. The relatively fast pace of the AAI
means it acts somewhat like a mild ‘stress test’, bringing forward an
individuals state of mind with regard to attachment:
“The central task the interview presents to participant is
that of (1) producing and reflecting on memories related to at-
tachment, while simultaneously (2) maintaining coherent, col-
laborative discourse with the interviewer (Hesse 1996). This
is not a easy as it might appear, and George and colleagues
(1985, 1996) have remarked upon the potential of the protocol
to “surprise the unconscious”. As indicated above, the inter-
view requires the speaker to reflect on and answer a multitude
of complex questions regarding his or her life history, the great
majority of which the speaker will never have been asked be-
fore. In contrast to ordinary conversations, where the intervie-
wee has time for planning, the AAI moves at a relatively rapid
pace, and usually all questions and probes have been presented
within an hour’s time. Ample opportunities are thereby pro-
vided for speakers to contradict themselves, to find themselves
unable to answer clearly, and/or to be drawn into excessively
lengthy or digressive discussions of particular topics” ([11], p.
555)
The AAI uses adherence to (or violation of) maxims for discourse
coherence as a proxy for how an individual thinks and feels about
their attachment experience. Transcripts with a lack of overall coher-
ence end up being categorised as such due to major contradictions
or inconsistencies, passages that are exceptionally short, long, irrel-
evant or difficult to understand and follow. The coding for the AAI
considers the use of language rather than making retrospective infer-
ences about the person’s actual attachment history [11]. It is not what
actually happened to an individual in their past that is important for
predicting an adult’s attachment approach, but the coherence of the
attachment narrative that the adult produces in the constrained AAI.
So adults of all AAI classifications may publically state the same
kinds of values.
In the AAI, interviewees can be classified into four categories. The
secure, dismissing and preoccupied enmeshed patterns are the most
popular adult classifications and considered ‘organised’ responses:
• secure autonomous adults express value for attachment relation-
ships and experiences, and give apparently objective responses
when asked about any particular relationship experience. When
reporting specific experiences they provide confirming detailed
memories and demonstrate ability to reflect on those experiences
with an understanding of why they, and others, behaved the way
they did - and this is the case for happy and troubled experiences.
So a secure autonomous adult might describe episodes of rejection
but recognise the limitations of attachment figures in a balanced
way, as well as include positive aspects of inadequate attachment
figures. So compared with other classifications, only secure au-
tonomous individuals are able to access all memories and respond
to queries about those memories in a controlled and appropriate
manner.
• dismissing adults devalue, or are emotionally cut off from at-
tachment relationships and experiences. These individuals provide
very short transcripts, with little to say about specific incidents
and attachment experiences from their childhood in general. Re-
sponses are not only short but minimise the importance of rela-
tionships in general. They may idealize relationships as ‘loving’
but not provide detailed examples to justify such positive sum-
mary statements. Compared with other classifications, dismissing
show attenuated access to memories, bias in the memories that
are provided, and an avoidance of the conversational subject of
attachment.
• preoccupied/enmeshed adults are preoccupied with (enmeshed
by) early attachments or attachment related experiences. When
reporting experiences these adults give plenty of detail and long
transcripts but fail to provide a good overview because they be-
come so entangled in the details. They may seem to be still en-
gaged in emotional struggles related to attachment relationships
Compared with other classifications, preoccupied/enmeshed indi-
viduals have access to past memories, but show bias in the mem-
ories that are reported, and show a lack of control in how these
memories are reported.
The unresolved/disorganised classification is less frequent than the
organised categories in non-clinical populations:
• unresolved/disorganised adults speak in unusual ways about loss
experiences, and exhibit: interruptions to cognitive processes, par-
ticularly in contexts associated with the lost person; disbelief that
loss has occurred or is permanent; unfounded fear of death; in-
complete mental and behavioural search processes, disorientation
in contexts linked to the lost person; and major lapses in metacog-
nitive monitoring of reasoning and discourse processes.
Longitudinal studies have looked at the relationship between cur-
rent AAI classification for adults and previous categorisation of their
behaviour as infants many years previously. Waters and co-workers
showed that 72% of participants had the same secure or insecure clas-
sification in infancy and adulthood [26]. They found that high levels
of life trauma had an impact on the AAI data and when those par-
ticipants were removed the AAI could predict 78% of attachment
security. Main and co-workers have presented similar results [13].
The adult’s internal ‘state of mind’ as indicated by coherence with
respect to past attachment relationships is the best predictor of how
they will conduct future attachment interactions, not the actual nature
of their previous attachment interactions or their explicitly professed
values. In addition, there is evidence that the state of mind of an
infant’s parent has a critical impact on the state of mind for that infant
as he or she develops on through childhood, adolescence and into
adulthood. As Bretherton and Munholland note:
“Overall, AAI findings suggest that parents induct their in-
fants into a way of relating that is consistent with their own
secure or conflicted/defensive models of self in relationships.
Developmental continuity from nonverbal behavioral and emo-
tional attachment patterns have been established in several lon-
gitudinal studies of middle-class families, but is great for secu-
rity than for specific subtypes of insecurity”([5], p. 118)
Longitudinal studies also provide valuable detailed evidence of
what aspects of early environment bring about later attachment clas-
sification. Broussard and Cassidy found that “adult participants
whose mothers had held negative perceptions of them as newborns
would be more likely to be classified as insecure on the AAI than par-
ticipants whose mothers had held positive perceptions of them” ([6],
p. 159). This association was gained for participants whose own AAI
was measured between 27-43 years after their parent’s perception of
them as a newborn infant with a projective measure that involved
their mother comparing them with “an average baby”. So it demon-
strates a significant association with a parent’s state of mind and at-
titude towards their newborn and the AAI classification many years
later of the grown-up infant. For the computational modeller, these
associations between individual difference categories, early care-
giving environment, expectations and values provide valuable con-
straints to evaluate and validate attachment models. The modelling
effort can start by re-producing response patterns from the AAI, and
designing architectures to produce these linguistically mediated in-
terview responses. Modelling can then go on to show how the same
architectures can produce different caregiving response patterns, and
hence demonstrate empirically observed patterns of intergenerational
transfer [20].
3 A PRELIMINARY ARCHITECTURAL
DESIGN
Simulating patterns of verbal interaction in the AAI will require
a complex architecture. This section presents a simple architecture
which falls short of this challenge but which can show the direction
of travel for the modelling effort. The hybrid architecture illustrated
in figure 2 situates reactive subsystems alongside a deliberative plan-
ning subsystem (that allows ‘look-ahead’ reasoning) and a simple
meta-management subsystem (where cognitive meta-processes op-
erate on other cognitive processes) [18, p. 103-151]. In this hybrid
architecture, the attentive processes that occur are those not stopped
by a resource limited variable attention filter. These resource bound
serial deliberative processes take input from non-attentive reactive
or perceptual processes which operate in parallel. Reactive motive
generactivators are triggered and activated by any possibly relevant
internal and external events. In the attachment domain there will be
possible threats but also possible exploratory and social opportuni-
ties. When these conditions are met a motivator is constructed which
may ‘surface’ through the attentional filter and be operated upon by
processes in the deliberative or meta-management levels. Amongst
the deliberative attachment processes generated by motivators are the
creation, selection, and execution of action plans. Deliberative pro-
cesses that evaluate other processes occur in the meta-management
layer. So an agent operating with this architecture can perceive the
world, record events, retrieve memories of events and plan future
action plans. What the architecture cannot do at all is communi-
cate through language with other agents. So this architecture might
be augmented with mechanisms such as those presented in Lewis
and Vashishth’s [12] simulation of sentence comprehension along-
side mechanisms of language production.
4 DEVELOPING SIMULATION SCENARIOS IS
AN ITERATIVE PROCESS TO GET THE
ABSTRACTION LEVEL RIGHT
Modelling the AAI to simulate attachment behaviours is more chal-
lenging than modelling infant attachment behaviours due to the com-
plex involvement of language in these interactions. Infant attachment
behaviours can be simulated in terms of proximity to location of
carer, orientation and non-linguistic communication [16, 17, 18, 19,
20]. The fact that linguistic interaction is central to the AAI means
that cognitive processing such as memory recall, speech planning,
considering the likely responses of others, and self-reflection, needs
to all be included and integrated. This means that how social stan-
dards interact with other motivational or affective states is also go-
ing to have a more significant impact in AAI modelling. In terms of
training, the agent is going to require a lexicon including attachment
related words as well as grammar that can simulate and capture typi-
cal AAI responses, but simulating the complexity of full natural lan-
Transcript fragment from real AAI Abstract description Description framed in scenario
ontology terms
My mom would stick up for me to the teacher, Specific evidence used to Infant ‘training’ phase
or to a kid’s parent, or anybody, really. support the statement Carer agent defends infant
I could put it another way, too. I just knew where relying on distinct memories. agent from other agents;
I stood with her, and that she’d be comforting if I No violations of relevance, comforts and supports during
was upset or crying or something. Oh, maybe you stays on topic. Flowing anxiety or distress; responds
wanted a specific example. Um, that time I set fire discourse, particularly sensitively when there are
absolutely positively wasn’t supposed to use... when engaging in memory cues to danger. Infant agent seeks
came running when the neighbours phoned the fire recall proximity in balance with exploration.
department about the smoke. I expected to get the Adult ‘test’ phase
life lectured out of me, but she just ran straight for [In the process of scenario Clear distinct memories that are
me and picked me up and hugged me real hard. formation entities such as verbalised fluently. Agent is able
Guess she was so scared and glad to see me, she chemistry sets, smoke and to give clear examples from infant
just forgot the lecture fire department are training phase. Responses have high
abstracted away] level of relevance to question.
I don’t remember ... (5 second pause). Well, because Not convincing support for Infant ‘training’ phase
she was caring and supportive. [interviewer prompt] adjective chosen. Attempt to Carer agent provides basic protection
Well ... (5 second pause), I guess like, well you know, create a positive picture. but is predictably (reliably) less
she drove me to school, and I was always really proud Response brief and broken responsive and less sensitive.
of her, I mean, she was really pretty, and she always in nature. Close proximity is a less high quality
took care of her appearance close coupling and cues unease.
[In the process of scenario Adult ‘test’ phase
formation entities such as Memories from training phase are not
cars are abstracted away] recalled in detail. Responses are short
and conform to externally provided
social standards
Uh, yeah, sort of very loving at times, like people Agent unable to stay with the Infant ‘training’ phase
were in the old days- uh, my youth, lot of changes question. Agent moves to Carer agent provides basic protection
since then. I remember home, and home was good irrelevant topics and memory but is unpredictably (unreliable) in
and that. And uh, loving, my wife is loving with [child] for events is an issue. how it responds and how sensitive
- taking him out to the movies tonight, special thing Speech is vague and it is. Close proximity does result in a
he’s been wanting to see all week, dadadada. comprehension is poor. high quality interaction.
Actually, it’s been more like a month, that turtle Adult ‘test’ phase
movie, don’t like it too much myself. Too many [In the process of scenario Incomplete marginally relevant
turtles- where are they from, outer space? Saw formation entities such as responses. Longer responses,
it, though, now, when was it, um, maybe 6 months movies are abstracted away] both in number of utterances
ago. Yeah she’s very loving with [child]. and also in terms of number of
really special, really grateful to her for that. not recalled.
my childhood, I remember just sitting on the
porch, rocking, rocking back and forth,
watching my parents, or maybe having some
lemonade- or, you know, this, that, and the
other. special sorts of things, just me and her.
I wasn’t easy, my temperament was hard on her,
kind of hard. Me and my cousins from [Town] going
down soon - really big birthday, she gonna be 80,
gives my age away (continues)
Figure 3. Example mini-scenarios using quotes by Hesse [11]. Question 3 in the AAI asks the participant to “Think of five adjectives, words, or phrases that
would best describe your relationship with your mother during childhood- say, between ages of 5 and 12, but even earlier if you can remember. Take a minute
to think, and then I am going to ask you why you chose them.” This question involves two levels of processing, the linguistic semantic description as well as
memory to recall the events associated with this. Column one of the table shows three example quotes from interviewees who all used the descriptor ’loving’ but
who were classified differently because of the discourse properties of their full responses. Column two is an abstraction of the response pattern in column one.
Column three describes a mini-scenario element which captures the abstraction pattern in column two but presents it in the context of the scenario ontology.
Figure 2. A hybrid attachment architecture with reactive, deliberative and
meta-management subsystems. The resource-constrained deliberative
subsystem takes input from the reactive-subsystem, carries out ‘look ahead’
reasoning, and can inhibit the reactive subsystem and execute alternative
actions. The green dashed line represents the fact that in the human
attachment system deliberative and meta-management processes require
attention and so are resource bound, which limits the number that can be
concurrently active. Currently, only a simple form of communication is
implemented in this architecture, with the agent able to receive and send
communications signalling affective tone. However, since the architecture
does allow internal processing of plan representations an extension for the
architecture will include adding the ability to broadcast and perceive these
representations.
guage processing will be avoided. Part of the rationale for modelling
attachment is that close inter-personal interactions can be described
in a more circumscribed manner than less close social interactions
within large groups. So the language level of interaction in the sim-
ulation will only be complex enough to capture abstract attachment
interactions and not the richness of real AAI transcripts [20].
In the first instance, to model AAI responses the three main clas-
sifications must be abstracted; secure autonomous; dismissing; and
preoccupied/enmeshed. Scenarios will include the discourse and at-
tentional flexibility that is typical for each of these classifications.
However, whilst capturing patterns of discourse, the simulations will
abstract away many concrete aspects of the real world that human
participants refer to. For example, secure autonomous agents will
be able to retrieve memories and reflect on them in an organised
way but the actual objects or episodes referred to will be abstrac-
tions. Similarly, whilst dismissing agents will express memory bi-
ases and an avoidance of attachment related discussions the biases
and avoided topics will be in terms of the abstract simulation on-
tology. The same process of abstraction will occur in scenarios for
preoccupied/enmeshed attachment. However, dismissing scenarios
will required an opposite kind of memory bias to dismissing scenar-
ios, with a lack of control over the reporting of memories that leads
to more emotionally charged memories being recounted [20]. Fur-
thermore, physiological responses to infant cries have been linked to
AAI. Ablow and co-workers [1] looked at the response in expectant
first time mothers. Those classified as secure on AAI showed phys-
iologically calmer reactions to the crying than those categorised as
insecure. When infant sensitivity was tested at 9 months postpartum
the secure group had higher levels of infant sensitivity.
Figure 3 shows a scenario fragment contrasting actual AAI tran-
script fragment, a highly abstract description, and then a more con-
crete description couched in terms of the scenario ontology (which is
significantly more abstract than the actual transcripts but allows for
some concrete operational descriptions of phenomena at this abstract
level). Producing scenarios that capture these behavioural patterns
will be an iterative process that find the right level of abstraction for
the scenario ontology [18]. This ontology must possess enough de-
tails to allow the AAI behavioural patterns to be simulated but also
abstract enough for the simulation to be tractable and not get bogged
down in detail which his not relevant to the phenomena of inter-
est. Future work will involve taking fragments of scenario such as
those presented in 3 and combining them with other mini-scenarios
to gain an overall specification of requirements which is represen-
tative of AAI responses generally. Producing scenarios which gain
a comprehensive (if highly abstract) coverage of the behavioral do-
main is important for model evaluation and validation. Whilst cogni-
tive models based on simulating timings or response accuracies can
be quantitatively evaluated, this is not possible for models which are
not attempting to simulate this kind of data. So evaluation and vali-
dation can be carried out by seeing how particular architectures from
an architectural design space manage in simulating a broad range of
competencies.
A general pattern for scenario elements is to describe events which
occur in the ‘infancy’ stage of the agent simulation, where agents
memories are recorded. Then in the ‘adult’ stage of the simulation
that agent is asked questions, accesses memories (in a more or less
effective manner) and a response pattern in verbal behaviour is pro-
duced. Another way of saying this is that agents that represent care-
givers and infants in a early experience ‘training’ stage for the sim-
ulation, the infant agent becomes an adult agent in the AAI compo-
nent of the simulation, and it is asked questions which require it to
draw upon its recorded memories of its infant experiences. In these
simulations the contribution to knowledge is not intended to be the
sophistication of the memory representations or linguistic utterances
but the way that particular agent architectures model processes such
as memory recall being effective or ineffective because of the manner
in which either memories become inaccessible or the opposite occurs
and disturbing memories are recalled even when this is not relevant.
So model evaluation and validation will be in terms of how well the
simulations reproduce defined qualitative patterns of behaviour.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper presents the case for using rich empirical data from AAI
studies to drive model formation of long-term personality-like con-
trol states. In this view, attachment styles which are observed in psy-
chological observations such as the AAI arise from the operation of
internal control states which are formed from the past experience of
low level events and activation of particular short-term control states.
In addition, possession of a certain attachment style predisposes an
architecture to particular short-term activation patterns for states such
as plans or emotions in the future. The function of long-term affective
states like attachment style is to organise past and future behaviour at
a higher level. In Donald’s terms, longer term awareness and gover-
nance by an attachment control states oversees processes of moment
to moment behaviour from a ‘larger landscape’ well beyond the im-
mediate perceptual context into the deep past and imagined future
[9]. Attachment control states do this by bringing together isolated
events into a stream of awareness and providing biases which in-
fluence all perceptions, memory retrievals and actions. Future work
will involve implementing agent-based simulations to produce ab-
stract and simplified versions of the narrative discourse patterns for
each AAI classification by augmenting existing attachment models
[21].
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